EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE  U.S. TRADEMARK USE DEBATE by Huang, Dr. Vicki T.
Masthead Logo Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 3 Article 1
4-1-2019
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
TRADEMARK USE DEBATE
Dr. Vicki T. Huang
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dr. Vicki T. Huang, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE U.S. TRADEMARK USE DEBATE, 35 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 1 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol35/iss3/1
  
 
1 
Senior Lecturer, Deakin Law School, Melbourne, Australia. LLB (Hons) Melb.; LLM 
Columbia; PhD Melb.; Admitted to the Supreme Court of Victoria and High Court of Australia; 
Admitted to the State Bar of California. I thank the following people who have commented on 
excerpts of this work in draft form: A/Prof Elizabeth Adeney (Deakin); Dr Catherine Bond 
(UNSW); A/Prof Jason Bosland (Melb); A/Prof Christopher Dent (Murdoch); A/Prof Dev 
Gangjee (Oxford); Prof Michael Handler (Uni. New South Wales); Janice Luck (Melb); Dr John 
Morss (Deakin); Prof Megan Richardson (Melb); A/Prof Amanda Scardamaglia (Swinburne). 
Any errors are the author’s own. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
U.S. TRADEMARK USE DEBATE 
By Dr. Vicki T. Huang 
There is considerable concern in U.S. trademark scholarship that 
privileging the “likelihood of consumer confusion” test has expanded 
trademark owners’ monopoly rights beyond traditional limits. An 
unfortunate consequence of this expansion is a chilling effect on useful 
and necessary artistic and commercial expression. To combat this, the 
introduction of an Australian-style “trademark use” threshold test has 
been vigorously debated. In Australia, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant has used the impugned sign as a badge of origin before 
confusing similarity is assessed. Therefore, if the defendant has not 
used the mark “as a trademark”, the case quickly resolves. However, 
a small number of U.S. critics have argued that a “trademark use” test 
will inevitably collapse into a labored, consumer-dependent inquiry, 
thereby neutralizing any supposed efficiency gains. This study provides 
an empirical analysis of Australian trademark infringement cases to 
challenge these critiques. Specifically, this paper conducts a systematic 
content analysis of all Australian infringement decisions under Section 
120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) reported over a twenty-year 
period (January 1, 1996 through January 1, 2016) – 78 cases. 
The empirical analysis shows that Australian cases that “turn on” 
trademark use resolve 39 percent more quickly than cases that “turn 
on” the issue of deceptive similarity. In addition, contrary to some U.S. 
critiques of the trademark use test, Australian courts when assessing 
use do not rely on questions of consumer confusion or an assessment 
of factors outside the inherent features of the mark. The determinative 
factors for Australian courts are the immediate context of the mark 
(such as the surrounding packaging) and an objective determination of 
the purpose and nature of that use (e.g., as a badge of origin or some 
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non-trademark use) and whether any policy considerations should 
apply. 
This paper argues that there are three distinctive features of the 
Australian trademark system that make a trademark use threshold test 
a successful efficiency tool. These are: (1) the Australian concept of a 
trademark as property, including an underlying history of infringement 
as a strict liability harm where consumer confusion is not central to 
liability; (2) the absence of a general tort of unfair competition 
anchored in elastic concepts of consumer confusion; and (3) well-
developed collateral actions which proscribe consumer confusion such 
as common law passing off and actions under consumer protection 
statutes. Because of the absence of these features in U.S. trademark 
law, the results of importing an Australian-style trademark use test 
would be difficult to predict. Nevertheless, it will be argued that the 
benefits of a trademark use test as demonstrated in this article can 
reinvigorate aspects the U.S. trademark use debate. 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 3 
A. The US Trademark Use Debate ............................................... 4 
B. Why This Expansion Is a Problem .......................................... 7 
C. Australian Trademark Infringement Law ................................ 9 
D. Arguments for Why the US Should Adopt a Trademark Use 
Test  ............................................................................................... 13 
E. The Goals of this Article ........................................................ 15 
I. METHODS .................................................................................. 16 
II. RESULTS .................................................................................... 16 
A. Trademark Use and Effect on Hearing Days ........................ 17 
B. What Factors Predict Trademark Use? ................................ 18 
1. Factor #1: Immediate Context ........................................... 19 
2. Factor #2: External Context .............................................. 20 
3. Factor #3: Reputation ........................................................ 21 
4. Factor #4: Consumer Confusion ........................................ 22 
5. Factor #5: Purpose and Nature of Use ............................... 22 
6. Factor #6: Policy Considerations ...................................... 23 
C. Summary of Results ............................................................... 27 
2019] Empirical Analysis  3 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ................................................. 29 
APPENDIX A: THE SELECTION AND CODING OF DECISIONS.............. 32 
A. Case Selection ....................................................................... 32 
B. Coding the Cases ................................................................... 34 
1. Case Details ....................................................................... 35 
2. Coding for Trademark Use ................................................ 36 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S., under the Lanham Act, to establish infringement of a 
registered mark under section 321 or an unregistered mark under 
section 43,2 the plaintiff must show ownership of a valid mark and that 
the defendant’s use of the mark in connection with goods or services 
causes a “likelihood of confusion.”3 With regard to infringement, the 
likelihood of consumer confusion has been called “the litmus test”4 or 
“touchstone” for establishing trademark liability.5 
In contrast, under Australian trademark infringement law, the 
plaintiff must first show the defendant’s impugned use is use of a mark 
as a trademark, that is “as a badge of origin.” This operates as a 
threshold test before confusing similarity between the plaintiff and the 
defendant’s marks is evaluated. In the U.S., although there is some 
inter-circuit dispute over the existence of a threshold “use 
requirement,”6 it can be said that, prima facie, there is no requirement 
to establish “trademark use” to find infringement. 
                                                            
1 Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C § 1114 (2012). 
2 Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
3 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
23:11.50 (2017) (“[F]or infringement of federally registered marks, what the Lanham Act requires 
is that the accused use be ‘in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising 
of any goods or services’ in a context that is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception. 
Similarly, for unregistered marks, the Lanham Act requires that the accused use be ‘on or in 
connection with any goods or services’ and be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as 
to the affiliation, connection or association of the accused person with the plaintiff or as to the 
origin of the ‘goods, services or commercial activities’ of the accused person. Similar language 
applies to false advertising claims.”) (citations omitted). 
4 Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) 
(“[T]rademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With some significant exceptions, 
the basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a 
substantial number of consumers and not otherwise.”). 
5 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007). 
6 See, e.g., Interactive Products Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant did not infringe by using the plaintiffs “laptraveler” mark 
in the defendant’s URL “a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveller/dkfl-lt.htm.”). See also 
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A. The US Trademark Use Debate 
Whether U.S. trademark law could or should include a threshold 
trademark use test has been the subject of significant debate. Indeed, it 
has been said that “[t]he debate over ‘trademark use’ is a hot-button 
issue in intellectual property (‘IP’) law”7 and that “trademark use is all 
the rage.”8 However, there are deep divides over many issues, including 
(but not limited to) the doctrinal locus of use,9 its normative value, its 
pragmatic intersections with tests of consumer confusion, and whether 
express defenses for non-trademark use should be preferred.10 
For example, with regard to doctrinal locus, “most trademark ‘use 
advocates’ and ‘use critics’ agree that the Lanham Act does not 
explicitly make trademark use an element of infringement.”11 However, 
most scholars “differ over the doctrine’s implicit status.”12 “Proponents 
of the doctrine . . . argue that the trademark use requirement has always 
been a foundational principle of trademark law.”13 These advocates, 
including Margreth Barrett, Stacey Dogan, and Mark Lemley, posit 
that the use requirement not only underlies all U.S. trademark law,14 
                                                            
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23:11.50. 
7 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007). 
8 Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773 (2009). 
9 See id. at 791. 
10 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture: Developing Defenses in 
Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 152 (2009) (“However, as the scope of 
trademark protection expands and the metes and bounds of protection become more uncertain, we 
cannot rely exclusively on creative interpretation of the prima facie cause of action to establish 
limits. Trademark law must more consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values 
at stake in trademark disputes.”). 
11 McKenna, supra note 8, at 791 (citing Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1609; Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2006)). 
12 McKenna, supra note 8, at 791 (emphasis added). 
13 Id. at 791. See also id. at 792-97 (providing a lengthy summary of the debate as to the textual 
or formalistic search for the trademark use requirement); id. at 791 n.86 (“Use in commerce is a 
requirement under both section 32 and section 43(a), though the requirement is articulated 
somewhat differently in each section . . . . ‘Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
registrant . . . , use in commerce . . . shall be liable.’”) (quoting Lanham Act. § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C 
§ 1114(1)(a) (2006)). 
14 Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting 
Infringement Liability to Uses “In The Manner Of A Mark”, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893, 956 
(2008) (“In summary, the Lanham Act’s legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not 
intend for the section 45 definition of ‘use in commerce’ only to apply in the registration context, 
but, in fact (at least at the time of enactment) associated the definition more directly with the 
infringement context than the registration context. The ‘use in commerce’ definition conceptually 
incorporates and perpetuates the essential ‘affixation or other close association’ (or ‘trademark 
use’) requirement of the 1905 and 1920 trademark acts.”); see also id. at 960 (“A third way to 
find the trademark use requirement in the Lanham Act infringement causes of action is to 
recognize that the Lanham Act implicitly incorporates it from the common law, even in the 
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but also has “always informed trademark practice.”15 In contrast, “use 
critics,” such as Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, argue 
that there is no trademark use requirement and that “use” is a concept 
limited to the acquisition of rights.16 
Although engagement with the debate appears to have waned over 
recent years, the reasons for its initial attractiveness have certainly not 
abated. One of the critical normative concerns in U.S. trademark law 
has been that actionable consumer confusion has expanded unbounded. 
For example, in trademark infringement law, actionable confusion has 
traditionally meant consumer confusion as to the source of the goods 
or services.17 However, under modern U.S. approaches, it appears that 
actionable confusion has moved beyond confusion as to source18 and 
now proscribes non-source confusion over non-competing goods.19 
Some of these “non-source confusion” activities have become more 
visible because of commercial activities on the Internet.20 For example, 
actionable confusion has been litigated in the context of dilution,21 
                                                            
absence of express statutory language.”); see also id. at 962 (“Professors Dogan and Lemley 
appear to recognize the existence of a trademark use requirement in the statutory language, but 
also argue that a trademark use requirement is implicit in the likelihood of confusion standard 
(whose factors take for granted that the defendant has used the mark to promote its own sales) 
and in cases defining indirect infringement liability.”) (citations omitted). 
15 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 541, 542 (2012). 
16 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1609 (“There is no statutory language expressly supporting 
the trademark use theory. Even proponents of the theory concede as much.”) (citations omitted).  
17 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:2 (“Today, the law of all state statutory and common law rules 
governing trademark and service mark infringement is the same as that of federal law: there is 
infringement if there is a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or 
connection.”). 
18 Id. 
19 See generally id., § 24:8 (“In view of the expansive nature of the test of likelihood of confusion 
as to sponsorship, affiliation or connection, where is the outer limit of uses far removed from the 
senior user’s usage which will still cause such confusion?”); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra 
note 4, at 454 (arguing that the likelihood confusion test in relation to sponsorship or affiliation 
has become too vague and “that trademark law can best deal with sponsorship or affiliation claims 
by taking a page from history and returning this subset of cases to its roots in false advertising 
law.”). 
20 Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135, 139 (2010) 
(describing the flux of search engine cases as being the “straw man” in the trademark use debate); 
see also Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1600 (“Supporters of this position have been spurred 
to excavate the theory in hopes of furthering a number of contemporary policy objectives, 
primarily with regard to online contextual advertising and affiliation merchandising.”); see also 
Barrett, supra note 14, at 894-95 (“the [I]nternet has provided increased opportunities for 
innovative uses of other people’s marks to capture or divert online customers, to gripe or complain 
about the trademark owner, to parody or criticize. . .”). 
21 See, e.g., Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418 (2003), superseded by Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2(1), 120 Stat 1730 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2012)). See generally Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 
(2006); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 15; Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of 
6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
initial interest confusion,22 post-sale confusion,23 approval/affiliation 
confusion,24 endorsement confusion,25 keyword advertising,26 and 
potentially the infringement of hashtags.27 In these cases, while 
                                                            
“Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1314 n.35 (2012); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public 
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1191-94 (1948); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687 (1999); 
Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L. 
J. 1717 (1999). 
22 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1839, 1905-6 (2007) (describing initial interest confusion as “when a junior party uses a 
competitor’s mark to attract the attention of consumers who otherwise likely would have avoided 
the junior user altogether. Having generated this interest, the junior user then dispels any 
confusion about the source of its products, hoping that the consumer will decide, for lack of time 
or interest or because she has been persuaded of the junior user’s superior product, to purchase 
the substitute product rather than continue her search.”). See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
105 (2005). See also Vicki Huang, Liability for “Invisible” Use of Trade Marks on the Internet, 
28 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 51 (2018) (discussing Australian perspectives of initial interest 
confusion). 
23 See McKenna, supra note 22, at 1907-8 (describing post-sale confusion as making “actionable 
the confusion of non-purchasers based on their post-sale interaction with a product, [which] 
requires rank speculation about viewers’ future purchasing intentions.”) (citing Mastercrafters 
Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 
1955)). 
24 See generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1599. See also Lemley & McKenna, supra 
note 4, 413-15, 428 (“We think the concept of sponsorship or affiliation, introduced to 
accommodate these broader claims, is to blame for much of what ails modern trademark law.” 
Lemley and McKenna argue that “trademark law needs to refocus on confusion that is actually 
relevant to purchasing decisions. Specifically, it should anchor once again to the core case of 
confusion regarding the actual source of the defendant’s product or service, the type of confusion 
most obviously related to consumer decision making.”). 
25 Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627, 627 
(2016). 
26 See generally John Benton Russell, New Tenth Circuit’s Standards: Competitive Keyword 
Advertising and Initial Interest Confusion in 1-800 Contacts v. Lens.com, 30 BERKELEY TECH. 
L. J. 993, 993 (2015) (“Since the advent of search engines, companies have used their competitors’ 
trademarks to manipulate search engine results and increase exposure to consumers online. This 
practice, called ‘competitive keyword advertising’ originally used keyword meta tags now 
obsolete, but today occurs through systems like Google AdWords. The AdWords system allows 
businesses to create advertisements and bid on specific keywords, so that when users enter these 
specific keywords into Google’s search engine, the search returns the created advertisement along 
with other ads on the results page. Almost any keyword is available for bidding – including a 
competitor’s trademarks. Thus, through this system companies can bid on their competitors’ 
trademark, even without the competitors’ permission.”) (citations omitted); Sarah Wells Orrick, 
Deciphering Rosetta Stone: Why the Least Cost Avoider Principle Unlocks the Code to 
Contributory Trademark Infringement in Keyword Advertising, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 805 
(2013); Winnie Hung, Limiting Initial Interest Confusion Claims in Keyword Advertising, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 647 (2012); Kristin Kemnitzer, Beyond Rescue.com v. Google: The Future 
of Keyword Advertising, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 401 (2010). 
27 See generally Robert T Sherwin, #Have We Really Thought This Through?: Why Granting 
Trademark Protection to Hashtags is Unnecessary, Duplicative, and Downright Dangerous, 29 
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consumers may be confused in a nominal sense, that confusion is 
arguably not the result of use by the defendant of the plaintiff’s 
trademark as a badge of origin. For example, in initial interest 
confusion cases where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark as a 
meta-tag, the consumer does not even see the defendant’s use of the 
impugned mark; the consumer only sees and is “confused by” the result 
of that use.28 
Although “[t]his expansion began for plausible reasons – 
consumers might be confused to their detriment in at least some cases 
in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actually compete 
directly,”29 the widening assumption that all types of consumer 
confusion may be harmful has made it “impossible to establish 
meaningful limits on what sorts of confusion are actionable.”30 There 
is a concern that U.S. courts are finding infringement for “practices that 
might be confusing in some sense, but that do not affect consumers’ 
decision-making process.”31 McKenna has argued that the idea that any 
confusion is somehow harmful has led to a number of trademark 
doctrines that seek to protect all elements of value or that sees all 
consumer confusion as an actionable harm.32  
B. Why This Expansion Is a Problem 
Many trademark scholars would agree that the privileging of 
consumer confusion has had consequential harms. These harms include 
a chilling effect on socially valuable (i.e. nominal, decorative, and 
descriptive) but unlicensed uses of marks,33 the inhibition of free 
                                                            
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 455 (2016) (discussing the USPTO guidelines on registrability of hashtags 
as per U.S.P.T.O. TMEP §1202.18 (Oct. 2013)). 
28 Huang, supra note 22, at 56-57. 
29 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 414. 
30 Id. at 422. 
31 Id. at 414. 
32 See McKenna, supra note 22, at 1915 (“Virtually every significant doctrinal development in 
the last century has given mark owners greater control over the use and meaning of their 
marks.  Strong marks have been the obvious – and intended – beneficiaries of expanded 
protection, as trademark law has aimed to reserve to mark owners the entire value of ‘their’ 
marks.”). See also William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 253 (2013) (“Yet trademark law's structure now encourages courts to 
act otherwise, as if confusion itself were the ultimate evil with which trademark law is concerned 
and as if its optimal level were zero. Trademark adjudication increasingly fetishized confusion 
over the last half century while simultaneously expanding its scope to cover dramatically more 
situations.”); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 453 (“Trademark law has expanded 
dramatically in the last century to the point where it now prohibits conduct by companies that 
seems unlikely to confuse consumers in any material way. The result is a long series of seemingly 
absurd decisions. We think the problem is that courts have presumed that if consumers are 
confused at all, that confusion is problematic.”). 
33 See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 32, at 282-87. 
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speech,34 and the flow of useful market information.35 In response to 
this, a range of scholars have thought that some form of “trademark use 
theory” in the U.S. could serve as a threshold filter and thus limit the 
“harmful effects” of the widening confusion-based test.36 However, 
numerous equally distinguished scholars accept that the likelihood of 
confusion test has gone too far but argue against the existence or the 
application of a trademark use theory for a broad range of reasons. For 
example, Professors Dinwoodie and Janis “reject the theory both 
descriptively and prescriptively,”37 claiming that the absence of a 
normative38 or doctrinal foundation39 for the inclusion of a trademark 
use threshold means that it cannot “provide the certainty its proponents 
promise.”40 Moreover, they claim that it may be counterproductive 
because it undermines “transparent trademark decision making.”41 
                                                            
34 For an interesting discussion of the U.S. concept of free speech under the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution in a registration context, see Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ , 137 S. Ct. 1744 
(2017). See also Vicki Huang, Comparative Analysis of US and Australian Trade Mark 
Applications for “The Slants”, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 429 (2018). 
35 See Margreth Barrett, Reconciling Fair Use and Trademark Use, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 1, 5 (2010). See also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1672 (“[W]e fear 
. . . a world in which intermediaries, for fear of liability, fail to use consumer-generated trademark 
signals at all in designing their business models. In this world, Amazon.com would hesitate before 
recommending alternative, lower-cost electronics products to a consumer seeking an expensive 
brand.”). Proponents also argue that this fetishization of consumer confusion can lead to 
unjustified market appropriation, inefficient litigation and a distortion of adjunct doctrines, such 
as secondary liability, where keyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under 
the guise of direct infringement suits. 
36 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1674 (“[T]he trademark use doctrine, properly applied, 
serves as a limited tool for identifying classes of behavior that cannot constitute infringement.”); 
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 371, 395-96 (2006) (“In the course of evaluating infringement and dilution claims in this 
new and unique setting [on the Internet], courts have too often lost sight of the important limiting 
function the trademark use requirement should play.”); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the 
Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 708 (2004) (“[T]he misinterpretation of 
the trademark use requirement – or more accurately, the flat-out disregard of that requirement – 
has given rise to a veritable cottage industry among the courts, an entire line of cases that are 
wrongly decided, that impose trademark infringement liability where none exists . . . ”); Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L. J. 507, 593-94 
(2005) (arguing that the Lanham Act provides a trademark use requirement that needs to be 
applied to immunize search providers from liability). 
37 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1602. 
38 Id. at 1667 (“Trademark use theory cannot be justified on a search costs rationale, and it will 
not provide the certainty its proponents promise. By ignoring the multivalence of trademark law, 
the theory threatens to undermine transparent trademark decision making. Instead, trademark law 
should retain its traditional preference for contextualism and should place assessments of 
confusion over supposedly deterministic characterizations of use.”). 
39 Id. at 1667 (“The trademark use theory is flawed. It lacks a firm foundation in existing law, and 
it would be counterproductive if adopted as a metaprinciple for future trademark law and 
policy.”). 
40 Id. at 1667. 
41 Id. at 1667. 
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They further argue that the use theory is overly formalistic42 and fails 
to acknowledge the role of statutory defenses.43 It is in this scholarly 
context that Dinwoodie and Janis critique the Australian trademark use 
test. 
C. Australian Trademark Infringement Law 
In Australia, only registered marks are protected under the 
Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Trademark infringement 
litigation that proceeds under Section 120(1)44 or 120(2)45 requires the 
plaintiff to show “use as a trademark” by the defendant, and a level of 
confusing “similarity” (substantial identity or deceptive similarity) 
between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s mark. The concepts of 
consumer confusion are embedded in the considerations of similarity. 
In addition, the impugned use must have a degree of “relatedness” with 
respect to the goods or services for which the plaintiff’s mark is 
registered. Section 120(3)46 further allows the plaintiff to pursue an 
                                                            
42 Id. at 1605 n.35 (“However, to the extent that the trademark use theory imposes on courts a 
form of reasoning divorced from policy objectives, without any concomitant reduction in 
administrative or error costs that might provide a utilitarian basis for such a departure . . . the 
approach can fairly be characterized as inappropriately formalistic.”) (citations omitted). 
43 Dinwoodie, supra note 10, at 99 (“I suggest that trademark law would be better served if several 
of its limits were explicitly conceptualized as defenses to an action for infringement, that is, as 
rules permitting unauthorized uses of marks even where such uses implicate the affirmative 
concerns of trademark law and thus support a prima facie cause of action by the trademark owner 
. . . . Conceiving of limits as defenses would help ensure that the (often unstated) values underlying 
socially desirable third-party uses are not too readily disregarded if they happen to conflict with 
confusion-avoidance concerns that are historically powerful drivers of trademark protection.”). 
44 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(1) (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if 
the person uses as a trademark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, 
the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trademark is registered.”). 
45 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(2) (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if 
the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar 
to, the trade mark in relation to: (a) goods of the same description as that of goods (registered 
goods) in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or (b) services that are closely related to 
registered goods; or (c) services of the same description as that of services (registered services) 
in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or (d) goods that are closely related to registered 
services. However, the person is not taken to have infringed the trade mark if the person 
establishes that using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.”). 
46 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(3) (Austl.) (“A person infringes a registered trade mark if: 
(a) the trade mark is well known in Australia; and (b) the person uses as a trade mark a sign that 
is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to: (i) goods 
(unrelated goods) that are not of the same description as that of the goods in respect of which the 
trade mark is registered (registered goods) or are not closely related to services in respect of which 
the trade mark is registered (registered services); or (ii) services (unrelated services) that are not 
of the same description as that of the registered services or are not closely related to registered 
goods; and (c) because the trademark is well known, the sign would be likely to be taken as 
indicating a connection between the unrelated goods or services and the registered owner of the 
trade mark; and (d) for that reason, the interests of the registered owner are likely to be adversely 
affected.”). 
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infringement claim (subject to certain conditions) for use on 
“unrelated” goods or services if the plaintiff’s mark is “well-known.”47 
Therefore, to make out a claim for trademark infringement under 
Section 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant has used or proposes to use48 in Australia, a 
substantially identical or deceptively similar sign as a trademark,49 in 
relation to goods or services50 for which the plaintiff’s mark is 
registered. Note that in Australia, the trademark use test requires the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant is using the impugned mark as a 
badge of origin to itself and not as an indication that the defendant’s 
marked goods or services somehow come from the plaintiff.51   
Unlike U.S. trademark infringement law, the Australian statutory 
test proceeds in multiple parts and not as a multi-factor test for a single 
concept of “likelihood of confusion.” In the U.S., the multi-factor tests 
are “explicitly and uniformly applied in their respective circuits”52 and 
“district courts give every appearance of scrupulously following a basic 
weighted additive decision strategy.”53 Judges are obliged to discuss all 
of the factors in the multi-factor test even if they are only tangential to 
the substance of case.54 However, the broad elements of the Australian 
statutory test – use, deceptive similarity (or substantial identity), and 
relatedness – undergo no routinised scrutiny. For each of these 
elements, there are no multi-factor tests nor is there a method with 
                                                            
47 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(4) (Austl.) (“In deciding, for the purposes of paragraph 
(3)(a), whether a trade mark is well known in Australia, one must take account of the extent to 
which the trade mark is known within the relevant sector of the public, whether as a result of the 
promotion of the trade mark or for any other reason.”) (emphasis original). 
48 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 7(4) (Austl.) (“[U]se of a trademark in relation to goods means 
use of the trade mark upon, or in physical or other relation to, the goods (including second-hand 
goods).”). Note that this provision reflects more the physical application of the mark rather than 
its metaphysical “use,” which is dealt with in case law. 
49 See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 17 (Austl.) (“A trade mark is a sign used, or intended to be 
used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person 
from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any other person.”) (emphasis original). 
50 See Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 6 (Austl.) (“goods of a person means goods dealt with or 
provided in the course of trade by the person.”). 
51 See E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 144, ¶ 43 (Austl.) 
holding that “‘[u]se “as a trade mark” is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it 
indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark 
to the goods . . . That is the concept embodied in the definition of “trade mark” in s 17 – a sign 
used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with 
by someone else.’ That statement should be approved.” (quoting Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect 
Distributors Ltd (1996) 96 FCR 107, 115 (Austl.)). 
52 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1594 (2006). 
53 Id. at 1593 (emphasis original). 
54 Note that from this Beebe was able to compute a stampeding score – a score showing the degree 
to which the non-relevant factors were collapsed to satisfy the outcome of the test. 
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which judges must examine the “use” or “deceptive similarity” 
elements of an infringement case. Rather, judges begin with the broad 
language of the statute and then apply the tests that have developed in 
the relevant case law. In Australia, there are no “set” factors, and if an 
element is irrelevant, the judge will likely not discuss it in a judgment. 
Another critical difference is that in Australia, use at the time of 
registration is not required, and, as a general principle, trademark rights 
arise from registration. In contrast, in the U.S., trademark rights are 
generally attained by “use” or “intention to use”55 and the scope of 
rights is “defined by that party’s use.”56 However, it should be noted 
that Australia and the U.S. are imperfect exemplars of registration and 
use systems, respectively.57 The difficulties in trying to reconcile these 
imperfect rights acquisition systems with laws relating to the 
infringement of those rights have recently been explored in both a 
U.S.58 and Australian59 context and are therefore not discussed here. 
A relevant consequence of not requiring use at registration in 
Australia is that when determining infringement, the court may need to 
                                                            
55 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §1051 (2012). For a discussion of the use and 
misuse of the US registration system, in particular intent-to-use applications, see Barton Beebe, 
Is the Trademark Office a Rubber Stamp? 48 HOUS. L. REV. 751 (2011) (finding that the number 
of intent-to-use and use-based applications allowed since 1989 were similar). But see id. at 773 
(“a large proportion of [intent-to-use] applications that were published . . . failed to survive to 
registration . . . of these 84 percent failed because the applicant failed to file a statement of use.”). 
56 McKenna, supra note 8, at 779. 
57 Jane C. Ginsburg, Response: Euro-Yearnings? Moving Toward a “Substantive” Registration-
Based Trademark Regime, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 95, 97-98 (2017) (noting that the Lanham 
Act provides “incentives to register: perhaps most importantly by giving priority dating from 
filing rather than from first use in commerce, and also by making trademark rights enforceable 
nationwide,” but refusal does not “prevent the unsuccessful applicant from using the mark and 
building up goodwill protectable by unfair competition claims both at state law under 
section 43(a) . . . . The disparity between grounds for refusal to register and on-the-ground 
acquisition of rights undermines the utility of registration even as it honors the role of consumer 
perception in giving rise to trademark rights. Even the most significant recent development toward 
convergence of registration and enforceable rights in fact underscores the disconnect between the 
two regimes.”) (citations omitted). 
58 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American 
Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 881 (2017) (“In the United States . . . we have told 
ourselves that both systems, registration and general protection against confusion, have the same 
goals and the same mechanisms. The result has been increasing tension between irreconcilable 
empirical and conceptual approaches to trademark problems.”). 
59 Robert Burrell, Trademark Bureaucracies, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK 
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 95, 95 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2009) (“One 
thing that is striking about these justifications [for trademark protection], however, is that they 
provide little explanation of trademark registration. This disjuncture between the standard 
justifications for trademark protection and the existence and operation of registered trademark 
systems is significant, because having a registered trademark system requires a substantial 
expenditure of resources.”) (emphasis original). See also Michael Handler & Robert Burrell, 
Reconciling Use-Based and Registration-Based Rights within the Trademark System: What the 
Problems with Section 58A of the Trade Marks Act Tell Us, 42 FED. L. REV. 91, 92 (2014). 
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construct the scope of the plaintiff’s rights by assessing the plaintiff’s 
hypothetical or potential use on the goods or services for which its 
marks are registered.60 Some argue that infringement of the owner’s 
rights (as defined by the scope of registration) is somewhat akin to the 
exercise of a property right under a strict liability standard.61 This is 
perhaps a logical outcome of the Australian Constitutional inclusion of 
trademarks as a species of industrial property (akin to a patent).62 
Another important point of distinction between Australian and 
U.S. trademark law is that Australian litigants typically pursue 
concurrent actions in common law passing off and misleading conduct 
under federal consumer protection statutes (typically Section 18 of the 
Australian Consumer Law).63 These actions are also available to 
protect unregistered, common law marks and are very well developed. 
In Australia, passing off provides broad protection for a trader’s 
goodwill against certain kinds of misrepresentations by others, while 
Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law64 prohibits misleading and 
deceptive conduct against consumers. In Australia, there is no general 
tort of unfair competition.65 No doctrine of singular scope protects the 
“sweat of the brow” or the products of intellectual effort. Rather, 
traders need to seek relief under various “special heads”66 of protection. 
                                                            
60 See MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd & Ors (1998) 90 FCR 236, 245 (Austl.) 
(“It is true, in infringement proceedings, that the question to be asked is in one respect at least 
somewhat artificial: the person who may be caused to wonder is not one who knows of the actual 
business of the proprietor of the registered mark, the goods it produces or the services it provides, 
but one who is to be credited with a recollection of the mark in relation to the full range of goods 
or services to which the registration extends. That degree of artificiality can be justified on the 
ground that it is necessary in order to provide protection to the proprietor’s statutory monopoly to 
it/s full extent.”). 
61 See ROBERT BURRELL & MICHAEL HANDLER, AUSTRALIAN TRADE MARK LAW 370 (2nd ed. 
2016) (ebook) (“Thus, on its face, s 120(1) seems to set up something like strict liability. In 
contrast, a defendant can avoid liability under s 120(2) if it can establish that its use of the mark 
‘is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.’”). 
62 See JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia; British American Tobacco Australasia 
Limited v The Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1, ¶ 35 (Austl.) (per French CJ) (“Registered trade 
marks, designs, patents and copyright in works and other subject matter give rise to, or constitute, 
exclusive rights which are property to which s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution can apply. They are 
all rights which are created by statute in order to serve public purposes.”). See also Megan 
Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 193, 203 (2004) (explaining that 
the introduction of a formal register for trademarks is significant because it reflected the 
understanding at the time that a mark denoted manufacturing or trade origin, that is, as a form of 
industrial property). 
63 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 18 (Austl.) (“(1) A person must not, in trade 
or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
(2) Nothing in Part 3-1 (which is about unfair practices) limits by implication subsection (1).”). 
64 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (Austl.). 
65 See Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 (Austl.). 
66 See Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509 
(Dixon J) (Austl.) (In rejecting a general tort of unfair competition, the High Court held, “[t]his is 
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D. Arguments for Why the US Should Adopt a Trademark Use 
Test 
U.S. trademark use advocates argue that adoption of a use 
threshold could improve the efficiency of American trademark 
disputes. However, use critics argue that an assessment of whether the 
defendant has used the mark as a trademark is beleaguered by the 
absence of a definition of use and could dissolve into a fact-dependent 
consumer confusion analysis, rendering any efficiency gains 
nugatory.67 
Dinwoodie and Janis argue that trademark use as a limiting 
doctrine cannot lead to greater certainty or efficiency in infringement 
cases and that, historically, considerations of trademark use in the U.S. 
ownership context have morphed into lengthy considerations of 
consumers’ mental associations.68 They argue that imposing a 
trademark use requirement would provoke the “development of 
ancillary use doctrines” and these, in turn, would likely incorporate 
considerations of consumer association and likely confusion.69 For 
example, potential disputes may arise as to whether “advertising and 
sales activities … amount to trademark use” or that trademark owners 
may (too easily) raise “factual issues regarding consumer association 
or confusion as pertinent to assessments of use,”70 returning the court 
to the problematic issue of “consumer confusion” that a threshold use 
test was supposed to cure.71 
Dinwoodie and Janis also claim that international experience has 
shown that trademark use does not make trademark infringement 
litigation more efficient (i.e., by halting consideration if there is no 
actual use made out to the defendant). Rather, citing the Australian 
experience, they argue that the use threshold becomes bogged down by 
the same consumer-dependent inquiries that plague the consumer 
confusion test – for example, evidence of a consumer’s mental 
                                                            
sufficiently evidenced by the history of the law of copyright and by the fact that the exclusive 
right to inventions, trade marks, designs, trade name and reputation are dealt with in English law 
as special heads of protected interests, and not under a wide generalization.”).   
67 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1646-47 (“[A] trademark use requirement will become 
fertile ground for the development of ancillary use doctrines, and that assessments of trademark 
use are likely to incorporate considerations of consumer association and likely confusion. If this 
were to happen, certainty would not be enhanced.”) (citations omitted). 
68 Id. at 1646. 
69 Id. at 1646. 
70 Id. at 1647. 
71 See id.; McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 32, at 298 (“Both of us have argued before that 
these efforts were doomed because they required courts to consult the very same fickle consumer 
perception that anchors the likelihood of confusion analysis.”). 
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associations of the mark, considerations of advertising, and sales 
activities of both parties – to establish or refute trademark use; evidence 
of actual confusion is sought or experts or surveys are used to identify 
potential confusion.72 Thus, the imposition of a well-defined use 
threshold will not lead to any efficiency gains in litigation or certainty 
for the parties.73 
Citing Australia as a cautionary tale, Dinwoodie and Janis argue 
that: 
Recent international experience corroborates these concerns 
over the fact-intensive nature of trademark use. For example, 
the Australian Trademark Act expressly provides that a 
trademark is infringed only when a sign is used “as a mark.” 
But determining when a sign is used as a mark has proved 
extremely difficult. In particular, Australian courts have felt 
compelled to resort to contextual analysis, including evidence 
of actual confusion, in order to characterize the defendant’s 
use.74 
The authors also argue that in 2007, the European Court of Justice  
“seemed to endorse an approach tied closely to the factual question of 
confusion (or related antecedents of association).”75 Dinwoodie and 
Janis use this comparative analysis to argue that “trademark use is a far 
more complex and fact-dependent concept than its advocates admit” 
and therefore would not reduce litigation costs.76 
                                                            
72 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1647. 
73 Id. at 1646.  
74 Id. at 1647 (citations omitted). 
75 Id. at 1648-49 (“In that case, Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, the plaintiff car manufacturer sued 
a toy company that sold remote-controlled scale models of the plaintiff’s car bearing the plaintiff’s 
mark. The defendant argued that its use on scale model cars was not ‘use as a mark’ and, thus, 
was immune from liability under the German trademark statute. The Court did not say definitively 
whether the defendant’s use was as a matter of law of the type that came within the scope of the 
trademark owner’s rights. Instead the Court held that potential liability depended on whether the 
relevant consumer ‘perceived the sign identical to the [plaintiff’s] logo appearing on the scale 
models…as an indication that those products come from . . . [plaintiff] or an undertaking 
economically linked to it.’ This formulation is, in essence, an analysis of likely confusion or, more 
strictly, of antecedent consumer association that might in turn lead to confusion. The significance 
of Adam Opel from an American perspective is that it reinforces the lessons drawn from the 
Australian experience: trademark use is a requirement that ultimately will give way to an analysis 
of consumer association or likely confusion.” (footnotes omitted)). In Australia (unlike the 
German approach described above), the trademark use test requires the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant is using the impugned mark as a badge of origin to itself and not as an indication that 
those products come from the plaintiff. See E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd 
(2010) 241 CLR 144, ¶ 43 (Austl.). 
76 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1649 (“if US courts followed the same approach, the 
principal benefit claimed for the trademark use requirement – its purported gatekeeper function 
and, thus, reduced litigation costs – disappears.”) (citations omitted). 
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Some pro-trademark use advocates agree; for example, the most 
vocal pro-use scholars, Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley 
concede the point that when determining whether the defendants are 
using a sign as a mark, consumer perception needs to be assessed, thus 
overlapping with the much-maligned consumer confusion analysis: 
While we have no doubt about the existence of a trademark 
use doctrine, Dinwoodie and Janis raise legitimate concerns 
about the potential pitfalls of applying the doctrine at the 
boundaries . . . . [W]e recognize that applying the use-as-a-
mark requirement in every case would be counterproductive. 
In some cases, evaluating whether a defendant is using a mark 
as a trademark on its products requires inquiry into consumer 
perceptions about the use – an inquiry that turns on many of 
the same factors as the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.77 
Nevertheless, they do not consider this complaint an 
insurmountable hurdle and that trademark use overall would be of 
benefit to trademark infringement inquiry.78 In contrast to Dogan and 
Lemley, Professor McKenna (while not completely embracing 
Dinwoodie and Janis’s arguments) has agreed that the consumer 
association problems that could potentially plague a trademark use 
inquiry render the trademark use doctrine of neutral benefit in terms of 
providing a predictable limit to liability.79 
E. The Goals of this Article 
This article provides an empirical analysis of Australian 
trademark law to determine the function of the trademark use test in 
that jurisdiction.80 This article will use the results to challenge and 
                                                            
77 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1682-83 (citations omitted). See generally Stacey L. Dogan 
& Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L. 
J. 461 (2005). 
78 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1673 (“Despite what Dinwoodie and Janis claim, we do not 
view the trademark use doctrine as a panacea, a silver bullet, or a wonder theory. Indeed, as we 
explore in this Article, the trademark use doctrine has significant limitations that curtail its 
efficacy in marginal cases. Its real importance – and the place where the theory is gaining some 
traction – is in curtailing an utterly new form of trademark claim against parties that do not 
promote their own products or services under the protected mark.”). 
79 McKenna, supra note 8, at 828 (“Trademark law is in desperate need of a reliable limiting 
principle. Unfortunately, trademark use is not capable of filling that role. Although the Lanham 
Act does condition liability on a defendant making a source-indicating use of the plaintiff's mark, 
source indication, like virtually everything else in trademark law, can be determined only from 
the perspective of consumers. In fact, it is precisely this reliance on consumer understanding, and 
not courts’ failure to apply a robust trademark use doctrine, that is responsible for trademark law’s 
perpetual expansion.”). 
80 This article is drawn from a larger work in which all aspects of Australian trademark 
infringement were examined. See Vicki T. Huang, A 20-Year Empirical Investigation of Trade 
Mark Infringement Litigation in Australian Courts, 41 SYDNEY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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interrogate aspects of the U.S. trademark use debate. There are two 
specific, interrelated goals. First, to examine whether the application of 
the trademark use test results in efficiency gains compared with cases 
that proceed to assessments of deceptive similarity; second, to look 
more closely at how trademark use is determined by Australian courts 
– specifically, to examine whether reasoning surrounding the 
trademark use test involves considerations of factors inherent or 
exogenous to the marks themselves. For example, in assessing 
trademark use, do Australian courts (as suggested by Dinwoodie and 
Janis) rely on labor-intensive considerations of advertising and sales 
evidence or measures of consumer confusion from witnesses or 
surveys? Such considerations determine the value of the gatekeeper 
function of a trademark use test. 
I. METHODS 
This article conducts a systematic content analysis81 of all 
Australian infringement decisions under Section 120 of the Trade 
Marks Act 1995 reported over a twenty-year period (January 1, 1996 
through January 1, 2016) – 78 cases. Details regarding case selection 
and coding of the decisions are set out in Appendix A.82 The methods 
used in this article were inspired by Barton Beebe’s empirical study of 
U.S. trademark infringement law.83 
II. RESULTS 
The structure of the Section 120 inquiry sets out four core 
elements: (1) trademark use by the defendant, (2) substantial identity, 
(3) deceptive similarity with the plaintiff’s registered mark, and (4) 
relevant similarity of goods and/or services. A logistic regression of 78 
cases reveals that the most relevant elements for predicting a 
Section 120 win in a single variable model84 is trademark use (p < 
0.001) and deceptive similarity (p < 0.001). Courts did not significantly 
engage with considerations of substantial identity (p = 0.401) or 
similarities between goods and services (p = 0.323) in their written 
judgments. 
                                                            
81 See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 
CAL. L. REV. 63, 65-66 (2008) (“Content analysis works best when the judicial opinions . . . hold 
essentially equal value . . . . [C]onventional legal scholarship analyzes issues presented in one 
case or a small group of exceptional or weighty cases, content analysis works by analyzing a 
larger group of similarly weighted cases to find overall patterns.”). 
82 Also note recently published work based on the same data set. See Huang, supra note 80.  
83 See Beebe, supra note 52, at 1586. 
84 Multiple variable models factor in the co-linearity between variables. 
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For the 49 (out of 78) cases where trademark use was discussed, 
chi-square tests of association85 and frequency tables were performed. 
It was found that when a court found the defendant was not using the 
impugned sign as a trademark, the plaintiff lost the case 100 percent of 
the time (20 of 20 cases). When the judge found positive use, that is, 
that the defendant was using the impugned sign as a trademark, the 
plaintiff won 83 percent of the time (24 of 29 cases). In the five cases 
where the court found the defendant was using the impugned sign as a 
mark but the plaintiff still lost, this was because the plaintiff failed a 
subsequent element, for example, deceptive similarity. 
Overall, the results confirmed what is prescribed by the statute – 
if there is no trademark use by the defendant, the plaintiff will always 
lose. These findings generate the following questions: if use is so 
important, does use as a threshold ultimately lower the hearing days? 
Further, what factors do judges use to make a use determination? 
A. Trademark Use and Effect on Hearing Days 
From a close reading of the cases, consistent with previous 
studies,86 it became apparent that most Section 120 cases turned on one 
or two significant issues – notably trademark use or deceptive 
similarity, meaning one main element was generally dispositive of the 
case. For example, if the judge could dispose of the case early by 
finding the respondent had not “used” a mark as a trademark, the judge 
did not tend to discuss deceptive similarity in depth.87 In such 
                                                            
85 Chi-square = 32.73, df = 2, p < 0.001 for association between trade mark use yes/no/NA and 
Section 120 win/loss. 
86 See Jason Bosland, Kimberlee Weatherall & Paul Jensen, Trade Mark and Counterfeit 
Litigation in Australia, 2006 INTELL. PROP. Q. 347, 354-55 (“We collected data on the outcome 
of each decision . . . separately recording the outcome on infringement and validity of each 
trademark in dispute.”) (emphasis original); id. at 364 (“What we see in this data is that two 
grounds frequently arose in original proceedings: first, whether the infringing sign was 
‘deceptively similar’, and secondly, whether the alleged infringer’s sign was being ‘used as a 
trademark.’ Notably, these grounds mirror the most common grounds raised on appeal: the most 
frequent infringement issues raised (either successfully, or unsuccessfully) on appeal was whether 
the infringing sign was ‘deceptively similar’ to the registered trademark (six instances), followed 
closely by the question of whether the infringing sign was used ‘as a trademark’ (four instances). 
One reason why these two grounds dominate is that most other grounds are tailored to very 
specific circumstances – the issue of deceptive similarity will usually be one which parties in a 
non-counterfeiting case can contest.”) (citations omitted). 
87 There were seven cases where the judge found no trademark use but went on to discuss 
deceptive similarity for reasons of thoroughness or in case of appeal. See, e.g., Lift Shop v Easy 
Living Home Elevator (2013) 103 IPR 511, ¶ 46 (Austl.) (where the court found no use and that 
“[t]hat conclusion makes it unnecessary to deal in detail with the case alleging deceptive 
similarity. However, some short observations [regarding deceptive similarity] are in order.”); see 
also Sanitarium Health Food v Irrewarra Sourdough (2012) 292 ALR 101, ¶ 38 (Austl.); Nature’s 
Blend v Nestlé Australia (2010) 87 IPR 464, ¶¶ 24, 33 (Austl.); Sebel Furniture Ltd v Acoustic & 
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circumstances, it could be said the case “turned on” use. An in-depth 
look at each case was conducted to code each case for whether it 
“turned on” a main element. This allowed for classification of cases 
into mutually exclusive categories. 
 
Table 1 Case Turns on a Main Legal Element by Hearing 
Days 
 Use Deceptive 
Similarity 
Relatedness of 
Goods/Services 
Combination 
of Elements 
No. of cases 27 27 10 14 
Total hearing 
days 
84 117 27 64 
Average 
hearing days 
3.1 4.3 2.7 4.6 
 
Table 1 shows that cases that turned on the threshold issue of use 
took 3.1 hearing days on average. In contrast, cases that turned on 
deceptive similarity took 4.3 days to hear, which was 39 percent longer 
than cases that resolved on use. This was not surprising given that use 
is a “threshold test” prior to analysis of deceptive similarity. However, 
the point is that contrary to U.S. critics’ arguments, “use” did not 
prolong the hearing of a case. This begs the question, why? The next 
section looks more closely at judicial reasoning regarding trademark 
use in Australia. 
B. What Factors Predict Trademark Use? 
As discussed earlier, in Australia there is no multi-factor test to 
assess trademark infringement or its elements, such as trademark use. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, a multi-factor approach to 
“use” was constructed from the language of the statute and cases 
focused on use. These cases included those in relation to word marks 
used on packaging,88 shape marks where functionality impacts 
                                                            
Felts Pty Ltd (2009) 80 IPR 244, ¶ 162 (Austl.); Agapitos v Habibi [2014] WASC 47, ¶ 68 
(Austl.); Mid Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 561 (Austl.); Top Heavy 
Pty Ltd v Killin (1996) 34 IPR 282 (Austl.). 
88 See, e.g., Nature’s Blend, 87 IPR 464 ¶19 (where the Full Court listed important factors as 
follows: “Use as a trademark is use of the mark as a ‘badge of origin,’ a sign used to distinguish 
goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else”) 
(citations omitted); Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 
30 FCR 326, 347 (Austl.) (“A mark may contain descriptive elements but still be a ‘badge of 
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assertions of use89, and Internet cases where use has been discussed in 
the context of domain name registration,90 meta-tags, and keywords.91 
Although many factors were initially hypothesized, some overlapped 
or were found to be redundant. The six key constructed factors retained 
for analysis are described below. 
1. Factor #1: Immediate Context 
In an Australian infringement case, the main “use” question for 
the court is whether that mark is being used as a badge of origin. The 
foundational case of Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil 
(Australia) Ltd (hereinafter Oil Drop Case)92 dictates that context is 
                                                            
origin.’ ”); Shell Co of Aust v. Esso Standard Oil Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407, 422 (Austl.); Anheuser-
Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar (2002) 56 IPR 182, ¶ 186 (Austl.) (“In determining the nature 
and purpose of the impugned words, the court must ask what a person looking at the label would 
see and take from it.”). 
89 See Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 16, ¶¶ 61-64 (Austl.) (where 
Sundberg J set out the principles relevant to the use of a shape as a trademark as follows: “The 
principles relevant to use of shape as a trademark are now set out. a) A special shape which is the 
whole or part of goods may serve as a badge of origin. However, the shape must have a feature 
that is ‘extra’ and distinct from the inherent form of the particular goods . . . . b) Non-descriptive 
features of a shape point towards a finding that such features are used for a trademark purpose. 
Where features are striking, trademark use will more readily be found. For example, features that 
make goods more arresting of appearance and more attractive may distinguish the goods from 
those of others . . . . c) Descriptive features, like descriptive words, make it more difficult to 
establish that those features distinguish the product. For example, the word COLA or an ordinary 
straight walled bottle are descriptive features that would have limited trademark significance. . . . 
d) Where the trademark comprises a shape which involves a substantial functional element in the 
goods, references to the shape are almost certainly to the nature of the goods themselves rather 
than use of the shape as a trademark . . . . For example, evidence that a shape was previously 
patented will weigh against a finding that the shape serves as a badge of origin . . . . e) If a shape 
or a feature of a shape is either concocted compared to the inherent form of the shaped goods or 
incidental to the subject matter of a patent, it is unlikely to be a shape having any functional 
element. This may point towards the shape being used as a trademark . . . . f) Whether a person 
has used a shape or a feature of a shape as a trademark is a matter for the court, and cannot be 
governed by the absence of evidence on the point . . . . g) Context ‘is all important’ and will 
typically characterise the mark’s use as either trademark use or not . . .”) (citations omitted). 
90 See Mantra Group Pty Ltd v Tailly Pty Ltd [No. 2] (2010) 183 FCR 450, ¶ 50 (Austl.) (where 
Reeves J said “It has been doubted whether the mere registration of a domain name containing 
the words of a trademark constitutes the use of those words as a trademark for the purposes of s 
120 of the Trade Marks Act. However, if the registered domain name is linked to a website that 
contains advertising material that promotes goods or services in relation to which the trademark 
is registered, this combination of use could constitute use as a trademark under s 120 of the Trade 
Marks Act. This is all the more so if the advertising material on the website also uses the words 
of the trademark to promote the goods or services concerned. In considering whether these 
situations constitute trademark use, it will be necessary to apply the general principles set out 
above to the particular circumstances.”). 
91 See, e.g., Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd (2017) 112 IPR 494 
(Austl.); Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty 
Ltd [2011] FCA 1319 (Austl.). 
92 Shell Co, 109 CLR 407. 
20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
“all important.”93 In this article, context means immediate context of 
the mark, that being “the totality of the packaging, including the way 
in which the words are displayed in relation to the goods and the 
existence of a label of a clear and dominant brand”94 or if “the sign is 
used in advertising, the relevant context will include the surrounding 
text.”95 What the defendant is using as its mark can refer to the 
“positioning of the sign, the type of font, the size of words or letters 
and the colors which are used, as well as how the sign is applied to 
advertising materials or the packaging of the goods in relation to other 
features.”96 
The existence of a label that includes a clear and dominant brand 
(that of the defendant) alongside an impugned mark may also be 
relevant in determining the “purpose and nature of the impugned 
words”.97 For example, in Beecham Group Plc v Colgate-Palmolive 
Pty Ltd,98 the plaintiff’s impugned mark was MACLEANS and the 
defendant’s use included a label presenting COLGATE 
MAXCLEAN.99 Use of indicia, such as capital letters, to emphasize a 
word may also be relevant.100 Assessment of the immediate context of 
use can be contrasted with external context discussed below. 
2. Factor #2: External Context 
One of the U.S. critiques of the Australian use test was that 
“Australian courts have felt compelled to resort to contextual analysis, 
including evidence of actual confusion, in order to characterize the 
defendant’s use.”101 This could include, for example, evidence of a 
consumer’s mental associations of the mark, considerations of 
advertising and sales activities of both parties to establish or refute 
trademark use, finding evidence of actual confusion or use of experts 
or surveys to identify potential confusion. The alleged judicial reliance 
on context was said to defeat the purpose of a trademark use threshold, 
meaning it would not lead to any efficiency gains in litigation or 
                                                            
93 Id. at 422 (per Kitto J). 
94 Nature’s Blend v Nestlé Australia (2010) 87 IPR 464, ¶ 19 (Austl.). 
95 Veda Advantage Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd (2016) 241 FCR 161, ¶115 (Austl.). 
96 Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344, ¶ 35 (Austl.). 
97 See infra II. B. 5. Factor #5: Purpose and Nature of Use. 
98 Beecham Group Plc v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 254 (Austl.). 
99 Id. See also Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 
FCR 326 (Austl.) (where the plaintiff’s mark was CAPLETS and the defendant’s use included 
TYLENOL CAPLETS); Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar (2002) 56 IPR 182 (Austl.) 
(where one of the plaintiff’s marks was BUDWEISER and one of the defendant’s labels presented 
BUDWEISER BUDVAR). 
100 See Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd & Anor v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 192 (Austl.). 
101 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1647. 
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certainty for the parties.102 Determining whether Australian courts 
actually rely on this type of context to determine use can challenge this 
claim. 
This factor is different from immediate context because it captures 
context that is less proximate to the trademark itself. Factor 2 external 
context refers to exogenous context that is far removed from the 
physical mark itself, such as evidence of sales and marketing budgets 
or considerations of industry practice. An Australian example of 
external context analysis can be seen in the case of Veda Advantage 
Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd103 where the court noted in its 
use analysis that the plaintiff’s marks could be purchased as keywords 
by the general public, including by the defendant and other 
competitors. Purchase of the plaintiff’s marks triggered sponsored and 
organic links to many companies, including to that of the defendant, its 
competitors, and the plaintiff. These facts were held to be “far from 
determinative” but “not irrelevant” to the finding that purchasing 
keywords of the plaintiff was not trademark use but merely a reflection 
of industry practice.104 Trademark use “critics” might see this 
reasoning as opening the door to litigants introducing evidence of 
exogenous factors (such as the market for keywords), thereby 
extending the length and costs of litigation. 
3. Factor #3: Reputation 
Another type of external context includes considerations of the 
level of fame of the plaintiff or its marks. Factor 3 relates to 
considerations of fame, renown, or reputation of the parties or their 
marks. This is analysed as a separate factor because there has been 
concern even among Australian scholars that reputation should not be 
considered when discussing a defendant’s use.105 For example, 
Professor Mark Davison has criticized the court’s consideration of the 
renown of the plaintiff’s mark in considering whether the defendant 
had used the mark “BSS” in the case of Alcon Inc v Bausch & Lomb 
(Australia) Pty Ltd.106 In Alcon, the court held the reputation of the 
mark affected whether a consumer would see the defendant’s use of 
“BSS” as a trademark or as a descriptive industry acronym for 
“balanced salt solution.” 
                                                            
102 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1646. 
103 Veda Advantage Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd (2016) 241 FCR 161 (Austl.). 
104 Id., ¶ 124 (Katzmann J). 
105 Mark Davison, Reputation in Trademark Infringement: Why Some Courts Think It Matters and 
Why It Should Not, 38 FED. L. REV. 231, 240-41 (2010). 
106 Alcon Inc v Bausch & Lomb (Australia) Pty Ltd (2009) 83 IPR 210 (Austl.). 
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4. Factor #4: Consumer Confusion 
This factor examines whether there is a lengthy, “fact intensive” 
consideration of consumer association and likely confusion, which, as 
Dinwoodie and Janis allege, includes “evidence of actual confusion, in 
order to characterize the defendant’s use.”107 The type of confusion 
relevant to this factor is narrowly defined. While consumer confusion 
in relation to deceptive similarity is a statutory requirement, confusion 
in relation to the question of whether the defendant is using its mark as 
a trademark is a different question. For example, if the court needs to 
determine whether PUMA is being used as a trademark on a 
defendant’s T-shirt, do they consider evidence that consumers were 
confused as to whether the use of PUMA was related to the famous 
sportswear brand or as a reference to a big jungle cat (a non-trademark 
descriptive use)?  
5. Factor #5: Purpose and Nature of Use 
This factor relates to whether the nature of the defendant’s use is 
actionable trademark use or whether the defendant’s use was 
descriptive,108 functional,109 common to the trade,110 or an otherwise 
non-infringing use of the impugned mark. Conversely, distinctive 
markings and invented words or phrases tend to indicate the sign is 
being used as a trademark.111 Note that “purpose” does not refer to the 
subjective intention of the alleged infringer.112 Rather, per the Oil Drop 
Case,113 the question of purpose and nature is an objective inquiry. 
First, “did the court consider the objective purpose and nature of the 
impugned use?” (yes/no); if so, “did the court find it favored a finding 
of trademark use?” (yes/no/not discussed). 
 
 
                                                            
107 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 5, at 1647. 
108 Descriptive features, like descriptive words, make it more difficult to establish that those 
features distinguish the product. For example, the word COLA or an ordinary straight walled 
bottle are descriptive features that would have limited trademark significance. See Mayne 
Industries Pty Ltd v Advanced Engineering Group Pty Ltd (2008) 75 IPR 102, ¶¶ 61-62 (Austl.);  
Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1996) 96 FCR 107, ¶ 25 (Austl.).  
109 See Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 16, ¶ 54 (Austl.). 
110 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 219 (Austl.) (permitting evidence of such trade usages to be 
adduced in trademark actions or proceedings). 
111 See, e.g., Beecham Group Plc v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 254, ¶ 47 (Austl.). 
112 See Sports Break Travel Pty Ltd v P & O Holidays Ltd (2000) 50 IPR 51, ¶ 14; Aldi Stores Ltd 
Partnership v Frito-Lay Trading Co GmbH (2001) 190 ALR 185. 
113 Shell Co of Aust v. Esso Standard Oil Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407, 422 (Austl.). 
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6. Factor #6: Policy Considerations 
In Australia, “[t]rade mark use is a highly malleable instrument. 
Often it is employed to secure important policy objectives.”114 For 
example, attempts to extend a patent monopoly over a shape by way of 
trademark law will be considered unfavorably. That is, “evidence that 
a shape was previously patented will weigh against a finding that the 
shape [now] serves as a badge of origin.”115 Whether the court makes 
express policy considerations is noted under this factor. 
a. Multi-Factor Model Relating to Trademark Use 
There were 49 cases in which there was more than a negligible 
discussion of use.116 Because there were only 49 cases in the sample 
and six variables of interest, a regression analysis was not appropriate. 
Instead, individual chi-square tests of association were performed. To 
maintain a conservative approach appropriate to the small sample size, 
the p-value of interest was reduced to p ≤ 0.01. 
                                                            
114 BURRELL & HANDLER, supra note 61, at 385. 
115 Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 16, ¶ 61 (Austl.) (citing Koninklijke 
Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90, ¶ 12 (Austl.); 
Mayne Industries Pty Ltd v Advanced Engineering Group Pty Ltd (2008) 75 IPR 102, ¶ 69 
(Austl.)). 
116 Noting that the balance of the cases proceeded directly to another part of Section 120, such as 
deceptive similarity. 
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Table 2 Association Between Factors and Trademark 
Use* 
Use Factor P-value for Chi-
Square 
Chi-Square Value 
Factor 1: Immediate context < 0.001 19.24 
Factor 2: External context 0.008 8.71 
Factor 3: Reputation 1.000 0.21 
Factor 4: Consumer 
confusion 
0.659 1.04 
Factor 5: Purpose and nature 
of use 
< 0.001 13.18 
Factor 6: Policy 
considerations 
0.004 10.28 
*df = 2, n = 49, chi-square performed with 4,999 permutations 
Noting the shaded rows in the table above, “immediate context” 
and “purpose and nature” were statistically significant, having p values 
< 0.001. The results also show that a third factor, “policy 
considerations,” was associated with a trademark use finding (p = 
0.004). 
To examine how these three factors affected the trademark use 
inquiry and whether that impact was positive or negative, frequency 
tables were constructed. These examined whether the judge found the 
factor (e.g., immediate context) relevant to the use inquiry and 
compared this with whether trademark use was found. The frequency 
tables and results of the chi-square test are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Frequency Cross Table for Factors that Influenced 
Use 
TM Use Outcome Factor 1: Immediate Context 
  Not Relevant No Yes Chi-Sq p value 
No TM Use 5 14 1 19.24 < 0.001 
Yes TM Use 16 3 10   
Count 21 17 11 49  
       
TM Use Outcome Factor 5: Purpose and Nature of Use 
  Not Relevant No Yes Chi-Sq p value 
No TM Use 12 8 0 13.18 < 0.001 
Yes TM Use 22 1 6   
Count 34 9 6 49  
            
TM Use Outcome Factor 6: Policy Considerations 
  Not Relevant No Yes Chi-Sq p value 
No TM Use 13 6 1 10.28 0.004 
Yes TM Use 25 0 4   
Count 38 6 5 49  
* df = 2, n = 49, chi-square performed with 4,999 permutations     
Regarding “immediate context,” Table 3 shows that where a judge 
provided negative commentary on the surrounding immediate context 
of the mark, no trademark use was found 82 percent of the time (14 out 
of 17 cases). Where there was positive discussion of the context of the 
impugned mark, the judge found trademark use 91 percent of the time 
(1 out of 11 cases). In other words, a finding on the immediate context 
factor heavily influenced a finding for or against trademark use. 
With regard to “purpose and nature,” where the judge found the 
objective purpose of the defendant’s sign was that it be used as a mark, 
the judge found trademark use 100 percent of the time (6 out of 6 
cases). Where the purpose and nature of the mark was not trademark 
use, the judge found no trademark use 89 percent of the time (8 out of 
9 cases). This would indicate that a finding on the purpose and nature 
of the defendant’s use is also reasonably dispositive of the use inquiry. 
With regard to “policy,” there were 11 of 49 cases where a policy 
objective was clearly articulated in relation to trademark use. Where 
the policy discussion veered against trademark use – for example, 
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where the court expressed concern over illegitimate monopolies117 – 
the court found against trademark use 100 percent of the time (6/6 
cases). Where the policy issue did not find against use, the court found 
trademark use 80 percent of the time (4/5 cases). 
b. Factors with Less Influence on Trademark Use 
Given the small sample size, a conclusion that factors are 
irrelevant should not be inferred. Rather, the statistics reveal that some 
factors have little association or predictive strength when they are the 
subject of judicial reasoning in relation to trademark use. 
                                                            
117 Mayne Industries Pty Ltd, 166 FCR 312 (which involved a prior patent for an “S” shaped fence 
dropper); Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344 (Austl.) (where the 
plaintiff attempted to monopolize a book title, “The Hunchback of Notre Dame”); Koninklijke 
Philips Electronics NV, 91 FCR 167 (where the plaintiff tried to protect a functional shaver head 
shape). 
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Table 4 Frequency Cross Table for Factors that were Less 
Influential on Use 
TM Use Outcome Factor 2: External Context 
  Not Relevant No Yes Chi-Sq p value 
No TM Use 12 7 1 8.71 0.008 
Yes TM Use 25 1 3   
Count 37 8 4 49  
            
TM Use Outcome Factor 3: Reputation 
  Not Relevant No Yes Chi-Sq p value 
No TM Use 17 2 1 0.21 1.000 
Yes TM Use 25 2 2   
Count 42 4 3 49  
            
TM Use Outcome Factor 4: Consumer Confusion 
  Not Relevant No Yes Chi-Sq p value 
No TM Use 13 5 2 1.04 0.659 
Yes TM Use 21 4 4   
Count 34 9 6 49  
* df = 2, n = 49, chi-square performed with 4,999 permutations    
Table 4 shows that these factors were not associated with a 
trademark use outcome: “reference to external context” (p = 0.008); 
“reputation of the mark or the parties” (p = 1.000), and “reference to 
consumer confusion” (p = 0.659). In the cases where comments were 
made with regard to external context, reputation, or confusion, the 
court’s decision on use could be either positive or negative. In other 
words, these factors were not influential or not strongly predictive of a 
trademark use outcome. 
C. Summary of Results 
In summary, a regression analysis of all 78 cases showed that 
trademark use and deceptive similarity were determinative elements in 
Section 120 trademark infringement litigation. Further analysis 
revealed trademark use cases resolved 39 percent more quickly than 
cases that went on to consider the question of deceptive similarity. 
Turning to the subset of 49 cases where trademark use was discussed, 
three factors were predictive of a trademark use finding: an assessment 
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of the immediate context of the mark, the purpose and nature of the 
defendant’s use, and consideration of policy issues. In general, the 
approach of the court was to look at the immediate context of the mark, 
such as the surrounding packaging. Then the court objectively 
determined the purpose and nature of that use, such as descriptive, 
decorative, or trademark use. Courts then discussed any policy 
considerations in relation to infringing use. In contrast, there was little 
consideration (or equivocal consideration) of factors relating to the 
external context of the mark, the reputation of the parties or their marks, 
or considerations of consumer confusion. 
It is significant that the two main factors the courts considered – 
immediate context and purpose and nature – relate to the inherent 
nature of the mark. It is argued here that the court’s containment of 
reasoning to endogenous factors keeps the trademark use assessment 
efficient by attaching the inquiry to an object (i.e., the impugned mark) 
to which both sides can identify.  
Interestingly, a discussion of policy issues correlated with the 
outcome of trademark use. These cases involved policy issues relating 
to descriptive words,118 test cases involving Internet use,119 shape 
marks,120 illegitimate monopolies,121 certifications,122 and 
disclaimers.123 In making these policy determinations, courts expressly 
stated their objective, for example, that monopolies over functional 
shapes are wrong.124 Australian courts did not gloss their reasoning 
                                                            
118 See, e.g., Australian Health and Nutrition Association Ltd v Irrewarra Estate Pty Ltd (2012) 
292 ALR 101 (Austl.) (litigating over the use of the word GRANOLA); South Australian Brewing 
Co Pty Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 719 (Austl.) (litigating over the 
use of the word SHOWDOWN). 
119 See, e.g., Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions 
Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1319 (Austl.) (involving meta-tags); Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone 
Plc (2005) 143 FCR 479 (Austl.) (involving sale of goods via the Internet); Buchanan Group Pty 
Ltd v Sorgetti [2002] FCA 1646 (Austl.) (involving cyber-squatting). 
120 See, e.g., Sebel Furniture Ltd v Acoustic & Felts Pty Ltd [No 2] (2009) 80 IPR 244 (Austl.) 
(where the plaintiff tried to claim infringement of a chair shape). 
121 See, e.g., Mayne Indus Pty Ltd v Advanced Eng’g Group Pty Ltd (2008) 166 FCR 312 (Austl.) 
(which involved a prior patent for an “S” shaped fence dropper); Christodoulou v Disney Enter 
Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344 (Austl.) (where the plaintiff attempted to monopolize a book title, “The 
Hunchback of Notre Dame)”; Koninklijke Philips Elec NV v Remington Products Australia Pty 
Ltd (1999) 91 FCR 167 (Austl.) (where the plaintiff tried to protect a functional shaver head 
shape). 
122 See, e.g., Halal Certification Authority Pty Ltd v Scadilone Pty Ltd (2014) 107 IPR 23 
(illegitimate halal certifications). 
123 See, e.g., Edgetec Int’l Pty Ltd v Zippykerb (NSW) Pty Ltd (2012) 98 IPR 1 (Austl.). 
124 See, e.g., Sebel Furniture Ltd v Acoustic & Felts Pty Ltd [No 2] (2009) 80 IPR 244, ¶ 144 
(Austl.) (“A shape cannot function as a trade mark if it is something that other traders may 
legitimately wish to use either because it is inherent to the particular goods (i.e. it is of their 
nature) or because it provides some technical or functional benefit to the goods.”) (emphasis 
original) (citing Koninklijke Philips Elec NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 91 
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with strained concerns for consumer confusion. This is perhaps another 
benefit of having a use threshold that is separate from a “confusing 
similarity” or “likelihood of confusion” test. 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Acknowledging that the U.S. trademark use debate touches on 
many unique aspects of U.S. trademark law – such as an extensive 
“trademark rights from use” jurisprudence, for which no parallel exists 
in Australia125 – this article defends the Australian trademark use test 
from Dinwoodie and Janis’s critique and provides some discussion of 
why the test works in Australia. Dinwoodie and Janis claim, 
“Australian courts have felt compelled to resort to contextual analysis, 
including evidence of actual confusion, in order to characterize the 
defendant’s use.”126  
However, analysis of the cases in this data set show that the 
determinative factors of use are actually endogenous to the marks 
themselves. While there is some contextual analysis, the persuasive 
analysis is not the exogenous context proscribed by Dinwoodie and 
Janis. Instead, Australian courts typically assess use with reference to 
the immediate context of the mark and then assess whether the 
objective purpose of the use is as a badge of origin. If courts discuss 
factors outside the inherent features of the mark (such as evidence of 
confusion), such assessments are generally not determinative of the 
trademark use question. Moreover, the data reveals that the Australian 
trademark use test is operating as an effective threshold test or limiting 
doctrine. The determination of trademark use (particularly a finding of 
the absence of trademark use by the defendant) allows cases to resolve 
before a lengthy discussion of similarity between the marks is required. 
Thus, cases that turn on use resolve 39 percent more quickly than cases 
that pass through a subsequent deceptive similarity analysis. 
This article posits that there are three distinctive features of the 
Australian trademark system that make a trademark use threshold 
successful as an efficiency tool in Australia. First, the concept of a 
trademark as property and the underlying idea of infringement as akin 
                                                            
FCR 167 (Austl.)); Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (2002) 122 
FCR 494, ¶ 137 (Austl.) (“Were the 1995 Act to enable the registration of a trade mark that 
would give the owner a monopoly over functional features it would indeed have made a radical 
change to trade mark law.”). 
125 As an example of a jurisdiction specific, trademark rights by use discussion, see Dinwoodie & 
Janis, supra note 5, at 1643 (discussing developments of ancillary use doctrines, such as token 
use in the context of establishment of rights cases, to illustrate the point that use “is no prescription 
for determinacy.”). 
126 Id. at 1647. 
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to a strict liability harm. In Australia, unlike the U.S., a trademark is 
defined as a species of intellectual property in the Constitution akin to 
copyright and patents.127 As a proprietary right, it can be argued that 
infringement under Section 120(1) has historically been akin to 
trespass. Thus, correction of confusion prior to sale (as with correcting 
a physical trespass to land), has been irrelevant to a finding of statutory 
trademark infringement although remedial mitigation may relate to 
damages. This proprietary concept leaves little room for reliance on 
consumer confusion to establish the wrong.  
A second difference is the absence of a general tort of unfair 
competition in Australia. In the U.S., trademark law sits under a 
broader head of unfair competition law (which has a strong focus on 
preventing consumer confusion) and which McKenna argues makes 
U.S. trademark law inherently unstable.128 The absence of a broad 
doctrine of unfair competition in Australia has meant that trademark 
jurisprudence has developed in line with doctrines relating to industrial 
property.  
The third distinctive aspect has been access to alternative “special 
heads” of protection129 in the form of unfair competition such as 
passing off and Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.130 These 
causes of action privilege arguments around consumer confusion as to 
trade source or confusion as to sponsorship or licensing. Access to 
these collateral claims removes the pressure from statutory trademark 
law to expand under the rhetoric of consumer confusion.  
These distinctive features of the Australian trademark system (and 
the utility of a trademark use threshold test) can be seen when 
comparing litigation relating to trademarks and the Google Ads system. 
Dogan points out that much of the US trademark use debate centers on 
the use and misuse of the Google Ads system.131 In the U.S., courts 
have strained to craft novel doctrines – such as initial interest confusion 
                                                            
127 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
128 See generally Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. BULLETIN 63 (2009). 
129 See Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 509 
(Dixon J) (Austl.) ("This is sufficiently evidenced by the history of the law of copyright and by 
the fact that the exclusive right to inventions, trade marks, designs, trade name and reputation 
are dealt with in English law as special heads of protected interests, and not under a wide 
generalization.”). 
130 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s18 (Austl.). Out of the 78 cases studied, 52 
cases included collateral claims. For more detailed analysis into the reasons and efficacy of 
collateral claiming, see Huang, supra note 80.  
131 Dogan, supra note 20, at 137 (“Virtually all of the scholars who oppose a trademark use 
doctrine have voiced the same fear – that a trademark use requirement would give search engines 
(or, let's be honest, Google) carte blanche to adopt advertising practices that purposefully deceive 
consumers.”). Note that GoogleAds were formerly known as “Google AdWords” until July 25, 
2018.   
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– to deal with the potential misdirection from use of another’s 
trademarks as a metatag, keyword, or Google Ad keyword.  
The Google Ads program allows a potential defendant to buy a 
plaintiff’s trademark via auction as a “keyword,” so that when a 
consumer searches using that plaintiff’s mark, Google may return 
results that highlight the defendant’s URL at the top or side of the 
search-page, typically distinguished via shading, or the words “Ad” or 
“sponsored”. Upon reviewing the search results, the consumer may be 
diverted and click on the defendant’s URL rather than the plaintiff’s. A 
plaintiff wanting to pursue the defendant or Google in this scenario 
would not be able to do so under Australian statutory trademark law 
because of the trademark use threshold.  
For example, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant’s 
use (of the plaintiff’s trademark) in the Google Ad system was being 
seen by the consumer as a form of trademark use by the defendant. 
However, the fact that the consumer cannot see the transaction between 
the defendant and Google means there is no relevant trademark use 
between the defendant and the consuming public. In addition, when 
looking at the defendant’s representations to Google, such as their 
auction bids on the plaintiff's trademarks that would be visible to 
Google, the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark would not be 
considered use as a badge of origin.   
To find Google (as opposed to the defendant) liable for trademark 
infringement, a plaintiff would have to show that Google, either by 
operating its Google Ad auctions or displaying ads generated by the 
auctions, was using the plaintiff’s mark as a trademark to indicate 
source to itself. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where a consumer 
would ever see this use as trademark use by Google. Even if the 
consumer did see the mark (for example, if the plaintiff’s trademark 
appeared on screen in juxtaposition with the defendant’s goods), the 
consumer would not interpret the use of that trademark as use by 
Google as Google’s own badge of origin.132    
The trademark use test means that cases against intermediaries 
such as Google must pursue a different legal path. In Australia, that 
well-beaten path is either under passing off, or a misleading and 
deceptive conduct claim under Section 18 of the Australian Consumer 
Law, or both. In Australia, cases against intermediaries, such as 
Google, have been brought in Australian courts under these flexible 
(yet demanding) causes of action.133 The flexibility in these causes of 
                                                            
132 Huang, supra note 22, at 53-54. 
133 See Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1, ¶ 83 
(Austl.) (unanimously holding that Google had not engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct 
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action has meant that unlike in the U.S., new internet-related 
infringements have not provoked doctrinal acrobatics in Australian 
statutory trademark law. The underlying concept of the trademark as 
property and the resistance to a general tort of unfair competition 
shields statutory trademark law from radical expansion.  
It is not suggested that the US adopt an Australia style trademark 
use test. While the Australian property approach may appear to be 
cleaner than litigating disputes as to consumer confusion, it does prima 
facie make the infringement inquiry more sensitive to judicial 
subjectivity which may trigger its own sets of distortions. And, it is 
acknowledged that the structural factors of Australian trademark law 
have developed in a different way to those in the U.S. Nevertheless, it 
is hoped that this article and the empirical findings regarding the 
benefits of a trademark threshold test can reinvigorate aspects of the 
U.S. trademark use debate.  
APPENDIX A: THE SELECTION AND CODING OF DECISIONS 
A. Case Selection 
The data for this article includes trademark infringement cases 
litigated under Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 up until Jan. 
1, 2016. The initial goal was to identify as many cases as possible. The 
cases were located using broad keyword searches in the Lexis Nexis 
AU Legal database – ‘all subscribed Australian case sources’ for all 
Australian jurisdictions. Keywords included ‘trademarks’ and 
‘infringement’ dated between January 1, 1996, and January 1, 2016. 
This broad search revealed 2,355 cases before duplicates were 
eliminated. Separately a similar search was run in a second database 
(Westlaw AU) and cross-checked against the Lexis Nexis AU list. This 
unearthed a small handful of additional cases.134 The final cross-check 
was done against a case list generated from the Austlii.edu.au database. 
No further additions were required. 
Cases that were solely “passing off” or solely breach of Section 18 
of the Australian Consumer Law (formerly Section 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) were excluded from the search results, 
although cases that decided trademark infringement actions with 
                                                            
contrary to Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) by publishing “sponsored links” in 
response to web page searches and as a general proposition, that it is the advertiser and not the 
intermediary search engine that is liable for the content of web advertising). Note that Section 52 
of the Trade Practices Act was replaced and misleading or deceptive conduct is now regulated 
under Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.  
134E.g., Société Des Produits Nestlé SA v Christian [No 4] [2014] FCCA 2968 (Austl.) (where the 
absence was reported and now rectified). 
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parallel actions in passing off or Section 18 of the Australian Consumer 
Law were included. Similar to Beebe’s study of US trademark 
infringement cases, those judgments that focused on ownership 
disputes, parallel imports, the earlier Trade Marks Act 1955, procedural 
issues, discovery issues, costs, damages, copyright, patents, designs 
law, or contract interpretation were removed for lack of a substantial 
discussion of the law of trademark infringement.135 As with Beebe’s 
study, cases dealing with counterfeits and first instance decisions that 
were reversed on appeal were removed from the analysis. Previous 
Australian studies have found that counterfeit cases are a distinct 
“world of trademark enforcement”136 and not representative of typical 
proceedings. Trademark use and deceptive similarity are not disputed 
issues in these cases and the defendant is often unrepresented or fails 
to appear.137 The proceeding is quickly disposed of138 and the trademark 
owner typically wins.139 Counterfeit cases were identified by the 
designation “counterfeit” in the headnote. “Counterfeit” is not a term 
defined in the Act; however, Australia is a signatory to the TRIPS 
Agreement wherein “counterfeit” is defined as the use of an identical 
trademark on goods or of a mark which “cannot be distinguished in its 
essential aspects’ from the owner’s mark.”140 
                                                            
135 See Beebe, supra note 52, at 1650 (“I excluded a small minority of fact patterns that led courts 
to apply the multifactor test in ways that could skew the results of the study. In most counterfeiting 
opinions, for example, the likelihood of confusion is very clear and the factors tend to weigh 
overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff. The same is true of opinions involving an alleged breach 
of a franchising, licensing, or distribution agreement. These opinions were thus excluded from the 
sample. For similar reasons, I also excluded opinions on motions to dismiss or on motions where 
the non-moving party failed to appear. I retained and noted opinions involving claims of reverse 
confusion, and fact patterns in which the defendant repackaged plaintiff’s goods.”) (citations 
omitted). 
136 See, e.g., Bosland et al., supra note 86, at 366. 
137 Id. at 347 (Bosland, Weatherall and Jensen used a dual analysis finding that “[a]nalysing the 
nature and outcomes of the trademark litigation, we found a more complex story than previous 
studies: counterfeit proceedings where the trademark owner always wins and the alleged infringer 
often fails to show up in court on the one hand; and more contentious proceedings on the other, 
where the trademark owner only succeeded around one-third of the time.”). 
138 Vicki Huang, Kimberlee Weatherall & Elizabeth Webster, The Use of Survey Evidence in 
Australian Trademark and Passing Off Cases, in THE LAW OF REPUTATION AND BRANDS IN THE 
ASIA PACIFIC 181, 189 (Andrew T. Kenyon et al. eds., 2012). On average, counterfeiting cases 
took 1.1 hearing days, compared with 2.4 days for passing off and trademark infringement, which 
illustrates the less complicated nature of the former. 
139 See, e.g., Bosland et al., supra note 86, at 366. 
140 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 
Article 51 note 14 (1994) (“[F]or the purposes of this Agreement: (a) ‘counterfeit trademark 
goods’ shall mean any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark 
which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot 
be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the 
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country of importation.”). 
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Only Section 120 infringement cases were considered relevant.141 
As in Beebe’s study, only cases that provided a “substantial discussion” 
of Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 were included. 
“Substantial” was defined liberally as “any use beyond the mere 
citation without analysis of the test.”142  Therefore, opposition cases that 
may have discussed relevant aspects of the law, such as Section 10 of 
the Trade Marks Act 1995 (deceptive similarity), were excluded. For 
example, Section 41 distinctiveness and Section 44 deceptive 
similarity cases were excluded. Cases that focused solely on Section 17 
“use as a trademark” were also excluded if they were discussed outside 
of a Section 120 determination. 
As with Beebe’s study, only first instance decisions that were not 
reversed on ultimate appeal were included.143 This meant that for all 
cases, it was determined whether the Section 120 portion of the 
decision underwent subsequent appeals.144 Twenty-two cases went to 
the Full Federal Court of Appeal, of which two proceeded to the High 
Court. Seventy-eight cases remained after the removal of appeals and 
first instance cases where the Section 120 finding was reversed.  The 
full list of 78 cases and further details regarding case selection is 
available from the author. 
B. Coding the Cases 
A major structural difference between U.S. trademark 
infringement law and Australian law is that the Australian statutory test 
proceeds in multiple parts and not as a multi-factor test for a single 
concept of “likelihood of confusion.” In Australia, the statute sets forth 
                                                            
This definition of “counterfeit,” as applied by Bosland et al.,  supra note 86, has been cited by 
the South African Supreme Court of Appeal (the highest court of appeal in South Africa in non-
constitutional law matters) in Cadac Inc v Weber Stephen Products Company 2011 (1) All SA 1 
(SCA) at 343 (S. Afr.), and more recently, by the Federal Court of Australia in Geneva 
Laboratories Ltd v Nguyen (2014) 110 IPR 295 (Austl.). 
141 For example, the following cases use the phrase “trademark infringement” but provide no 
discussion of Section 120: Oxford Funding Pty Ltd v Oxford Asia-Pacific Inv Pty Ltd [2005] 
FCA 1637 (Austl.); Virgin Enter Ltd v Virgin Home Loans Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1175 (Austl.). 
142 Beebe, supra note 52, at 1649. 
143 Id. at 1650 (“[From] a sample of 337 opinions he excluded the six opinions in which the 
outcome of the multifactor test was reversed, which yielded a final sample of 331 opinions.”). 
144 The methodology demanded that Section 120 reversals be removed from the data set. The 
consequence of this was that six well-known trademark cases were eliminated from the data set. 
These include: Frito-Lay Trading Co GmbH v Aldi Stores Ltd P’ship (2001) 52 IPR 410 (Austl.); 
Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distrib Ltd t/as Millers Distrib Co (1998) 43 IPR 47 (Austl.); 
Mobileworld Communc’n Pty Ltd v Q & Q Global Enter (2003) 61 IPR 98 (Austl.); E & J Gallo 
Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 77 IPR 69 (Austl.); Starr Partners Pty Ltd v Dem 
Prem Pty Ltd [No 2] (2006) 70 IPR 113 (Austl.); Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd v Idameneo 
(No 789) Ltd (2011) 91 IPR 547 (Austl). 
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three broad elements (or, more precisely, threshold tests) – “use” (as a 
trademark); “similarity between marks” (i.e., substantial identity or 
deceptive similarity); and “relatedness between goods and/or services” 
– within which multiple factors are at play. Deciding the outcome of 
each of these elements requires consideration of a number of what this 
article calls “factors.” Thus, rather than a linear, multi-factor inquiry, 
the Australian test proceeds as a matrix. This affects the coding of data. 
Beebe was able to use binary coding, that is, a yes/no answer was 
recorded in answer to his question of whether multi-factor “X” affected 
the outcome of the likelihood of confusion test. The pilot study 
revealed that this was not optimal for the Australian infringement test.  
For example, in Australia, a judge may consider aural similarity 
in a judgment, but this may only be in the context of recitation of prior 
case dicta. That is, mere mention of this factor may not relate to judicial 
reasoning of the merits of the case. To record the fact that “aural 
similarity” was mentioned, a code for “yes – discussed” was noted. A 
second round of coding was applied to examine whether the discussion 
of “aural similarity” was relevant to infringement (yes/no/neutral). For 
example, in this second round of coding, “yes” would mean that a 
discussion of aural similarity occurred, and it favored the plaintiff’s 
case. If coded “no,” this would mean a discussion of aural similarity 
occurred which went against the plaintiff’s case. If coded “neutral,” 
this meant a discussion of aural similarity occurred but had no 
meaningful effect on the plaintiff’s Section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 
1995 case. 
1. Case Details 
Twenty-eight variables were recorded in relation to general case 
details. This included general descriptive aspects, such as date, hearing 
days, judge, and court (including Fast Track). Grounds of suit were 
coded, including Section 120(1)-(3), passing off, and/or Section 18 of 
the Australian Consumer Law. Whether there was a win/loss or 
whether the result was unclear (e.g., remitted) was coded. Where the 
hearing and the judgment were heard and delivered within the same 
day, this was counted as zero days. Otherwise, the hearing length was 
estimated as one day unless further dates were listed in the header of 
the judgment. 
A difficulty with coding arose as for any one case, there could be 
at least one or multiple trademarks in suit. Beebe coded per case rather 
than per trademark. Similarly, Huang et al.145 coded by case and not by 
                                                            
145 Huang et al., supra note 13, at 185. 
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trademark. Win/loss was determined by case and not by mark. 
Therefore, if there were multiple marks litigated and one win, the case 
was coded as a “win” overall. 
2. Coding for Trademark Use 
Twenty potential variables of interest (derived from the 
foundation cases and literature) were recorded in relation to trademark 
use. These included factors that were exploratory in nature. After the 
pilot study, this was reduced to ten. For the purpose of this article, the 
variables of interest were reduced to six. For each element, whether a 
variable was discussed or mentioned was recorded. For example, if 
reputation was mentioned, it was coded “yes.” If it was not mentioned, 
it was coded “no.” The next question was whether or not the discussion 
favored a finding of infringement. For example, if the discussion of a 
plaintiff’s reputation favored a finding of infringement, it was coded as 
“yes.” If the plaintiff’s reputation favored a finding of no infringement, 
it was coded “no.” If the plaintiff’s reputation was merely mentioned 
but not factored into the judge’s infringement reasoning, it was coded 
“neutral.” 
 
 
 
